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1 Introduction 
 
The past decade has seen increasing attention given to the process termed 
‘financialisation’ within the socio-political and economic literature. The term is 
widely applied to various related phenomena; it is broadly defined by Epstein 
as designating “the increasing importance of financial markets, financial 
motives, financial institutions, and financial elites in the operation of the 
economy and its governing institutions, both at the national and international 
levels” (Epstein 2005:4). Various schools of thought exist as the precise 
nature and meaning of financialisation (see Section 2.1). 
 
It is important to make a distinction between financialisation and what is called 
‘financial development’ (see Levine 1999). The mainstream literature uses 
very broad definitions of financial development, such as how easily credit can 
be obtained or how enforceable contracts are, among many others (Levine, 
1999:9). Financialisation does not simply refer to an increase in financial 
industry sophistication, nor only to the laws and regulations that enable them. 
Instead, it considers the social, political and economic relationships arising 
from the increased importance of the financial industry and financial elites 
within the economy and the effects thereof. It also takes a critical stance on 
the potential dangers of the increased predominance of finance in the 
economy rooted in heterodox economics and political economy approaches. 
 
Despite the multiplicity of analysis, much of the financialisation literature 
approaches the subject on the macroeconomic level. While this highlights 
salient trends and the overall financialisation of many economies, such 
analyses do not necessarily capture processes of causation or pinpoint the 
consequences of financialisation for specific economies. Therefore a number 
of scholars suggest that firm-level analysis be the next phase of research on 
financialisation (Isaacs 2015; Krippner 2005; Bonizzi 2013), hence this 
paper’s contribution. 
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Of particular interest here are the studies within the financialisation literature 
on the agricultural sector because of the industry’s direct impact on 
development and food security. Particularly in the United States of America, 
the food crises of 2008 led to much popular and political dissatisfaction with 
financial institutions. This changing perception of the industry was supported 
by scholars like Michael Masters (Masters 2008) and Engelbert Stockhammer 
(Stockhammer 2008). In contrast to this, empirical studies from within the 
economic mainstream emerged, such as those by Dwight Sanders, Scott 
Irwin (Irwin & Sanders 2012) and Alexandra Dwyer (Dwyer et al. 2012) which 
showed little evidence that financial speculation – viewed as either a by-
product or a cause of financialisation – had detrimental consequences on 
agriculture and food security. Both sets of literature point to the increasing role 
of a well-embedded financial services industry within the agricultural sector. 
Whether this role is as a ‘neutral’ facilitative agent or the architect of self-
enriching crises needs to be determined on a contextual basis. Further broad, 
aggregated macroeconomic studies that depend heavily on mathematics and 
econometrics fail to adequately capture the social and political shifts of power 
within an economy. As such, firm-level studies offer a unique political 
economy perspective. 
 
Despite the burgeoning of the financialisation literature – especially as 
pioneered by the Financialisation, Economy Society and Sustainable 
Development research project (FESSUD) – there exists insufficient literature 
focused on developing countries (Bonizzi 2013). The reason for this is two-
fold. Firstly, since financialisation seems to represent a recent adaptation of 
capitalist accumulation that originally arose within the capitalist core, most 
initial studies were centred on the core, while only the most recent studies 
have branched out to focus on the periphery (Bonizzi 2013). Secondly, many 
developing nations lack sufficient economic data of the type needed to 
effectively analyse financialisation (Newman 2014). 
 
Here, South Africa is of heuristic value. As the most advanced economy in 
Africa, and housing among the most advanced financial industries in the world 
(WEF 2015), it is one of the developing countries that can, and has, been 
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studied recently within the financialisation literature, most notably by Susan 
Newman (2014), Gilad Isaacs (2015), Ben Fine (2013) and Sam Ashman 
(Ashman et al. 2011) on a macroeconomic level.  This paper, however, is an 
attempt to expand the much more limited literature on South African firms 
such as those done by Ward Anseeuw and Antoine Ducastel (Ducastel & 
Anseeuw 2014, 2013; Anseeuw & Ducastel 2010). 
 
As such, this paper will analyse two case studies from the agricultural 
industry: one ex-co-operative whose shares are traded fairly openly – Senwes 
Ltd. – and operates as a facilitating agent to primary agricultural producers, 
and one large family-owned conglomerate – the ZZ2 Group – with a private 
shareholding structure operating in primary agricultural production. This 
analysis highlights how the firms have responded to macroeconomic 
transformations in the form of internationalisation, liberalisation and the 
process of financialisation. It is particularly valuable to see how these changes 
have shaped the trajectory of agrarian transformation and how firm practices, 
such as employment and productivity, have changed in response to these 
dynamics. 
 
To lay the foundation for the analysis, Section 2 will review existing literature 
on financialisation, while Section 3 will give an overview of South African 
social and economic transformation over the past few decades. Section 4 and 
5 will be the case studies on Senwes and ZZ2, respectively, while Section 6 
concludes. 
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2 Review of Existing Literature 
2.1 Emergence of International Financialisation 
As noted earlier, the literature on financialisation is vast and varied. This 
section will therefore focus on only the most pertinent parts associated with 
the process on a microeconomic level.1 
 
It is important to begin by understanding some key concepts concerning the 
emergence of financialisation. Scholars such as Demir (2007), Dünhaupt 
(2012), Epstein (2005) and Jayadev (Epstein & Jayadev 2005) suggest the 
resurgence of a ‘rentier class’, which consists of an elite that accumulates 
only out of financial industry growth, speculation and its financial rents. This 
approach is common to the post-Keynesian school and is critiqued particularly 
by Marxian scholars (see Krippner, 2005 and Bonizzi 2013) who propose that 
the shift of the power balance from labour to capital as well as the growing 
importance of the sphere of circulation (production vis-à-vis interest-bearing 
capital) is different from arguing that financialisation simply marks the return of 
a rentier class (Lapavitsas 2010). Instead, financialisation is seen as a more 
fundamental restructuring of capitalist production and accumulation instead of 
the growth of a distinct subsection of the capitalist class (Isaacs 2015:50; 
Ashman et al. 2011:176; Newman 2014:31). The distinct lines between a 
rentier and a ‘productive’ capitalist class supposed in the Post-Keynesian 
literature is also not visible in capitalism today (Lapavitsas 2010). 
 
Stockhammer defines the signs indicating such a change in capitalist 
accumulation: 
 
“The deregulation of the financial sector and the proliferation of new 
financial instruments, the liberalization of international capital flows and 
increasing instability on exchange rate markets, a shift to market-based 
financial systems, the emergence of institutional investors as major player 
on financial markets and the boom (and bust) on asset markets, 
                                                     
1
 For a more complete and holistic approach to financialisation literature, the work by Bonizzi 
(2013) as well as that by Sawyer (2014) are both broad and quite complete. 
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shareholder value orientation and changes in corporate governance (of 
non-financial business), increased access to credit by previously 
‘underbanked’ groups or changes in the level of (real) interest rates. 
Financialization has also been used to highlight changes psychological 
and ideological structures (Sic).” (Stockhammer 2008:2) 
 
From a Marxian perspective, these elements all support the notion of an 
emerging restructuring of capitalist accumulation from a long-term production 
focused mode of investment in the real economy, towards a speculative 
investment focus in the financial sector of the economy (Lapavitsas 2010; in 
Demir 2007) or, as Krippner (2003) calls it, the ‘fictitious’ economy (because 
of the lack of underlying real productive value in speculative activity). It also 
represents a migration towards financial channels as a method of 
accumulation, often at the cost of productive investment in the real economy 
(Fine 2013; Kaltenbrunner & Karacimen 2016; Painceira 2009). As Section 3 
will show, many of these signs have been observed and analysed in the 
South African economy. The case studies will therefore have a particular 
focus on how agrarian capital has been applied – be that in the real or 
fictitious economy – as well as how it has migrated to financial channels, if at 
all. 
 
The emergence of financialisation has also been closely associated with 
economic and financial liberalisation and, consequently, financial crises 
(Stockhammer 2004; Fine 2013; Demir 2007; Orhangazi 2006; Krippner 
2005). Such liberalisation has led to periods of increased sensitivity to global 
financial market fluctuations and interest rate changes. This often coincides 
with a proliferation of derivative market investment instruments, and in many 
cases a boom and bust in fixed asset and financial markets (Krippner 2005; 
Stockhammer 2004; Demir 2007). Palma (2000; 2009) has thus strongly 
linked financialisation with an increased frequency and severity of financial 
crises, observed empirically. Evidence seems to point towards financialisation 
both being spread through crises, as well as inducing crises (Palma 2000; 
Ghosh 2005; Stockhammer 2012a). The case studies below support this view 
and show that it can make sense for financialisation to be seen as both 
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creating conditions for financial crises as well as expanding ‘financial 
entanglement’2 through crises. 
 
As such, it is important to understand that what is called the process of 
financialisation is not a linear path to be followed, nor is it a homogenous set 
of phenomena (Bonizzi 2013; Krippner 2005; Isaacs 2014; Becker et al. 2010; 
Fine 2013; Sawyer 2014). Kaltenbrunner and Karacimen (2016) examine the 
contradictory nature of financialisation where it lays both the foundation for 
productive capital growth, yet sows the seeds of speculative activity and 
crisis. Similarly, Lapavitsas (2010) show how the finance sector has had quite 
variegated interactions with the productive sector, making the relationship 
between the various actors quite complex. South African agriculture has also 
had variegated experiences of financialisation, and this study will tease apart 
some of the forces here at play. 
 
 
2.2 Effects of Financialisation 
 
An important feature of financialisation is the changing role of banks, 
something well documented by various scholars (Bonizzi 2013; Krippner 
2005; Stockhammer 2008; Demir 2007; Ashman et al. 2011). Not only have 
household’s share of debt often increased considerably (Isaacs 2015:37), but 
commercial banks also increasingly diversify their offerings to be a ‘one-stop-
shop’ that essentially permeates the entire economy (Ghosh 2005). In the 
developing world, this has often coincided with an expansion of foreign banks 
and non-banking institutions into domestic financial markets as a policy-
pushed initiative to attract foreign investment (Bonizzi 2013:91). This, coupled 
with the growth of other large institutional investors like domestic pension 
funds and insurance firms, results in the emergence of large institutional 
investors – mostly from the financial industry, with a resulting strong focus on 
                                                     
2
 Ghosh (2005) refers to the increased involvement of the financial industry in the non-
financial sectors of the economy as “financial entanglement”, illustrating how crisis in the 
financial sector spills over much more dramatically where there are high levels of 
entanglement. 
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maximising shareholder value (see below) (Bonizzi 2013; Ashman et al. 2011; 
Stockhammer 2010). These large macroeconomic phenomena still need 
further analysis on a microeconomic level to better understand the dynamics 
and causality (Krippner 2003; Levine 1999). 
 
Another oft-cited feature of financialisation is the concept of a ‘shareholder 
value orientation’. An excellent treatise on the concept can be found by 
Lazonick  and O’Sullivan (2000). This generally refers to corporate 
governance that is pre-occupied with maintaining good share price 
performance, and is associated with a ‘downsize and distribute’ strategy – 
including large dividend distributions to shareholders – as opposed to a ‘retain 
and re-invest’ strategy (Lazonick & O’Sullivan 2000). Because of the focus on 
share price performance, firms show great concern for accounting formulae 
like Return on Investment (ROI), Cost to Income Ratio and Return on Equity 
(ROE), among others. Although such a focus is not necessarily detrimental in 
and of itself, shareholder value maximisation is often associated with short-
term corporate restructuring and ‘rightsizing’ in the form of outsourcing and 
divestment that negatively affect both labour and capital in the long term 
(Froud et al. 2000: 772,788).  
 
Froud et al (2000:792) explain that “restructuring can be a defensive response 
by management which brings short-lived benefits for capital, as product, 
labour and capital market adjustments interact to create shareholder value”. 
Shareholder value principles often also replace other, more socially beneficial 
goals like customer retention, production and managerial efficiency and 
maintaining employee loyalty (Lazonick & O’Sullivan 2000). Essentially, a 
firm’s performance is thus transported to a function of financial accounting 
indices and delinked from productive capacity, innovation and expansion 
(Froud et al. 2000). 
 
Stockhammer (2010:4) further argues that the focus on accounting formulae 
has led corporates to rather take on debt as a source of capital, instead of 
equity, thus artificially creating a favourable ROE and increasing financial 
industry dependence. Similarly, firms also sell assets as part of a ‘rightsizing’ 
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strategy, which artificially makes ROI and Cost to Income look better in the 
short term (Michell & Toporowski 2013; Lazonick & O’Sullivan 2000). 
Corporates are also seen to sell assets or take on more debt to pay dividends 
or buy back shares, all aimed at boosting the share price (Dodig & Herr 2014). 
 
Another feature of financialisation is a perceived movement by non-financial 
corporations (NFCs) towards financial activity either because it is more 
profitable than alternative long-term investments in productive assets, or 
because it allows the firm to maximise shareholder value in the short term. 
Although it is not a new phenomenon to see firms using excess liquid capital 
to invest in financial markets, the sudden and large expansion of this activity 
represents a considerable crowding out of investment in productive capital 
stock in the real economy (Demir 2007; Orhangazi 2006). For example, 
Orhangazi (2006) found that the increasingly higher transfers to and from the 
financial markets by NFCs in the USA has significantly crowded out real 
capital accumulation, and exposed the economy to much more volatility and 
uncertainty (Orhangazi 2006). 
 
Finally, financialisation can also be seen in the investment decisions made in 
the form of significant corporate restructuring and unbundling of value in 
NFCs (Isaacs 2015; Demir 2007; Anseeuw & Ducastel 2010; Chabane et al. 
2006).  Although this effect can be closely linked to the shareholder value 
principle and activity in financial markets in the short run, it can also develop 
independently of the shareholder value principle as a means to safe-guard 
liquid capital (Ashman et al. 2011). In particular, one might see much 
outsourcing of ‘non-core’ corporate functions and a larger focus on what is 
perceived as being the ‘core’ business (Mvelase 2015; Ashman et al. 2011).  
The aim of such a strategy could be to make the share price more attractive 
by reducing costs, and increasing income from the sale of non-core assets. 
This effect of financialisation seems to have a strongly negative impact on 
development, particularly on food security, labour conditions and employment 
levels (Mvelase 2015; Brooks 2016; Anseeuw et al. 2011; Stockhammer 
2012b). 
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3 South African Political Economy and Financialisation 
3.1 Transformation of South African Finance 
 
Much has been written on South African economic and social transformation 
after Apartheid. This paper will not aim to capture all of the dynamics of this 
transformation, but builds upon Fine and Rustomjee’s seminal work on the 
Mineral Energy Complex (Fine & Rustomjee 1996) which has remained 
central to the transformation and gives valuable insight into the movement of 
Afrikaner and English capital. This section also draws heavily from the work of 
Isaacs (2015) and Newman et al. (2011) who wrote with a specific focus on 
financialisation and liberalisation, while Chabane et al. (2006) examine the 
corporate transformation in the country. 
 
The South African financial services industry evolved primarily out of 
necessity to power the capital intensive mining industry (Fine & Rustomjee 
1996). As such, it became very sophisticated, and in 2015 was ranked the 
12th most advanced in the world (WEF 2015). Mirroring concentration in the 
mining industry, the financial industry is also highly concentrated, where 5 
banks dominate the entire industry. To support the rapidly expanding mining 
industry, South Africa has also developed a large and efficient agricultural 
industry which had extensive government support ensuring that food prices 
remain low, enabling a cheap pool of labour (Fine & Rustomjee 1996). The 
strength of the mining industry and the isolation caused by Apartheid meant 
that a deep integration of domestic capital formed around mining, energy and 
the financial services industry, where the latter again invested considerably 
into the rest of the economy, with little foreign diversification (Carmody 2002).   
 
With the end of minority rule in 1994, the new democratic regime made 
considerable policy changes, most notably in broadly following Washington 
Consensus precepts. Much of the economy was swiftly liberalised and the 
many protection mechanisms were abandoned, notably so in agriculture. 
These changes have been a driving force behind the process of 
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financialisation. Between 1994 and 2014, the growth rate of gross value 
added (GVA) in the finance, insurance, real estate and business services 
sector was 4.7% compared with GDP growth of 3.1% (Isaacs 2015). The 
financial industry has expanded significantly since liberalisation, with market 
capitalisation to GDP increasing from 123% in 1990 to 291% in 2007 and 
subsequently declining to 160% in 2012 in conjunction with strong growth in 
currency and derivative exchanges (Isaacs 2015). Additionally, household 
debt also increased considerably, with the debt to GDP ratio peaking at 
between 80% and 104% of GDP in 2008 (Isaacs 2015).  
 
These changes were supported by the South African government through 
policies that enabled capital flight, more inclusive lending practices, and the 
creation of a favourable foreign financial/portfolio investment destination. 
There has also been a large movement of South African corporates taking 
funds offshore, especially towards global financial centres like London and 
New York. The opening up of South African markets to foreign portfolio and 
currency speculation has caused a dramatic increase in the stock of foreign 
assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP over the past two decades 
(Isaacs 2015), inducing considerable volatility and crowding out domestic 
gross capital formation.  
 
All of these indicators point towards an increasingly financialised South 
African economy on a macroeconomic level. Evidence of financialisation at a 
microeconomic level can be seen in the growing size and sophistication of 
commercial banks (Isaacs 2015) and the emergence of powerful domestic 
institutional shareholders like pension funds, mutual funds and insurance 
firms – these often wielding considerable sway over the governance of non-
financial corporations (NFCs). Additionally, Chabane et al (2006) have 
observed a concomitant reorientation in corporate governance towards 
shareholder value maximisation, showing the extent to which domestic South 
African firms have experienced financialisation. 
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3.2 Transformation of South African Agriculture 
These transformations in the broader economy have not left agriculture 
unaffected. The adoption of neoliberal policies meant that the powerful 
marketing boards and agricultural subsidies that favoured the white agrarian 
elite under Apartheid (Ducastel & Anseeuw 2016) were stopped, and, in an 
effort to redress past inequalities in the agricultural sector,3 various land-
reform policies were implemented. Although these initiatives have shown very 
little success4 thus far (Aliber & Cousins 2013; O’Laughlin et al. 2013), the 
impact they have had on agriculture was extensive. 
 
The end of protectionism saw a rapid reduction in firm numbers within the 
agricultural market. Old marketing boards and co-operatives often became 
large regional monopolies that were no longer heavily regulated and the 
larger, more efficient producers took over the less efficient ones who were no 
longer protected by government subsidies (see Ducastel & Anseeuw 2014; 
Manoim et al. 2007). Many of these subsequently became publicly-listed 
companies initially owned fully by the farmers themselves. Of those that did 
not become public entities, the vast majority are today large family-owned 
operations with a sizeable local economic footprint. Because of the increased 
concentration induced by deregulation in the agricultural market, the formation 
of strong farmer-cum-shareholder power groups could emerge – something 
that was not necessarily related to financialisation, but compounded its 
effects. This mirrors financialisation trends in the rest of the economy (Isaacs 
2015). The relatively poor quality soil, the suddenly more ‘expensive’ labour, 
increases in taxation and non-existent government support for the industry 
meant that, to compete globally, the survival of South African agriculture very 
                                                     
3
 The social dynamics in South Africa around agriculture is important to understanding its 
transformation. The white minority who ruled under Apartheid, known as the Afrikaner, is a 
group of naturalized settlers representing an amalgamation of Dutch, French, German and 
native Khoisan ancestry. This group formed a national identity around being farmers, with 
much of the cultural ceremonies revolving around it. They are also colloquially known as 
“Boere” which is Afrikaans for “farmer”. The agricultural industry therefore has a very 
strong cultural connotation where non-Afrikaners (even white English farmers) were often 
institutionally or socially excluded. For more on the transformation of Afrikaner capital, see 
Fine and Rustomjee (1996). 
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much depended upon maximising efficiencies and creating economies of 
scale (Manoim et al. 2007). 
 
Here, it is important to understand the psychological effects induced by such a 
sudden change. Farm owners went from being in a socially popular, 
economically and politically protected industry, to an industry with virtually no 
protection and heavy social and political opposition. This sudden shift 
introduced into the farming community an ‘us-against-them’ culture where 
survivalist, almost militant rhetoric became common. This was particularly 
pronounced in the more traditional farming sectors of grains and livestock, as 
the case studies illustrate. The suddenly embattled agricultural industry thus 
faced not only economic competition, but also looming land reform, Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies, more stringent labour policy and 
often violent social or labour dissatisfaction.5 
 
Changes within both the agricultural and financial sectors have changed the 
financial practices within agriculture. As Carmody (2002) explains, these 
changes have been mostly internally generated as the domestic economy 
embraced liberalisation policy. Before the liberalisation of the agricultural 
industry, the majority of agricultural debt was serviced by dedicated 
developmental banks and co-operatives such as the Land Bank whose sole 
aim was to make agricultural loans at subsidised rates. However, the new 
regime repurposed the Land Bank to lend more to previously disadvantaged 
farmers instead of established commercial farmers; making it more a tool of 
equity than one of agricultural development.6 This in turn caused a very large 
shift of agricultural debt towards commercial banks, as Figure 1 below shows. 
In 1974, a mere 21 percent of total agricultural debt was held by commercial 
banks, yet in 2007 it had risen to more than 61 percent (Department of 
Finance 2010). Despite this change in the source of borrowing, overall 
                                                     
5
 One of the most controversial and widespread farm-related forms of violence is the so-called 
“Farm Murders”.  Although the murders are incredibly brutal and violent, there are also 
widespread allegations that these murders mostly happen on farms with horrendous and 
equally violent labour practices.  Far-right Afrikaner movements have lodged cases of 
genocide with the United Nations because of this. 
6
 See the Strauss Commission findings and recommendations: DoA, 1996. 
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agricultural debt has remained fairly stable in real terms from the early 1990s 
onwards, as Figure 1 shows, reducing somewhat after the aggressive 
agricultural investment era of the mid 1980’s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to this commercialisation of agricultural debt, in 1995 the JSE also 
created an agricultural futures exchange (Safex) for grain and oilseed 
commodities.7 This would convert the once protectionist agricultural sector to 
an industry governed by financial market dynamics, now fully open to non-
agrarian speculation and international participation. The shift in key 
agricultural products from a mandated price (calculated on a cost-plus basis) 
to a free-floating market-determined prices8 naturally introduced considerable 
volatility (Wyk 2012). Today, the Safex bourse is considered a global leader in 
agricultural commodity trading because of its sophistication (Wyk 2012), and it 
trades more than eight times the underlying value of its commodities (Manoim 
                                                     
7
 Safex trades white and yellow maize, wheat, soy, sunflower seeds, sorghum and corn. 
These form the basis of the inputs into all major livestock and staple production chains. 
8
 Much has been written on price formation on Safex, most notably academics at the 
University of Pretoria (see Geyser & Cutts 2007; Cutts & Kirsten 2006). 
Figure 1 – Composition of South African Agricultural Debt 
Source: Department of Agriculture and Forestry 
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et al. 2007:5). This shows the financialised nature of the South African grain 
industry in particular. This transformation is summarised by Anseeuw et al.: 
 
“Today, the South African farming sector is thus one of the most deregulated, 
but also one of the most structured, offering a range of instruments of risk 
management to the investors. In the international context of the "revival" of 
agricultural investment, this country represents a convenient base for financial 
experiments. The countries’ land resources and its role as a regional power 
also stimulate the interest of the investors for this market. As such, South 
Africa [is] a laboratory of new agricultural and investment practices” (Anseeuw 
et al. 2011:4). 
 
The post-liberalisation period also saw increasing activity by financial 
institutions in the direct governance and control of agricultural firms – termed 
‘production grabbing’ by Anseeuw and Ducastel (2010). The Senwes case 
study, as well as Ducastel and Anseeuw’s (2014) study on Afgri Ltd., show 
how higher commercial debt levels formed the basis of agricultural 
financialisation and ‘production grabbing’ where fundamental organisational 
changes were imposed by large financial institutional shareholders and 
debtors. Afgri, being the largest competitor to Senwes Ltd., offers an 
interesting potential comparison that could be an outflow from this study. 
 
In summary, the South African experience of liberalisation and globalisation 
has been both extensive and swift. The result has been a clearly financialised 
economy that is very susceptible to international volatility. It also meant a 
change in the relationship between the financial industry and agricultural 
industry players emerges due to the shared severity of this transformation. As 
such, these dynamics and experience will be explored with reference to two 
specific case studies in the next section. 
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4 Case study – Senwes Ltd.9 
4.1 Introduction 
Senwes Ltd. is an ex-co-operative, formerly known as the Sentraal-Wes 
Kooperasie (or “Central-West Co-operation” in English), located in Klerksdorp 
in the North-West Province.  Its traditional locum of operation is in the Free 
State and North-West provinces, which still contain about 75% of its business 
units, though it has expanded into all other provinces of South Africa except 
for Limpopo and the Western Cape (the latter containing only 3 Senwes 
affiliated retailers). Although Senwes does not produce any primary 
agricultural output, it has emerged as a critical intermediary in the grain and 
oilseed industry and provides a very broad spectrum of agricultural services 
and products, from produce storage and transport, mechanisation support and 
equipment sales, retail agricultural product outlets and agricultural credit 
services. 
 
As a grain co-operative formed and capitalised in the Apartheid era, Senwes 
has seen considerable transformation since inception. At the outset it was 
characterised by state investment in the construction of its silo network –
investment that is generally not seen as very profitable because of the large 
capital outlays required, high maintenance costs, immovability and the fact 
that most silos are far from optimal capacity for most of the year (Manoim et 
al. 2007). It was also, like all co-operatives, protected by law from competition. 
 
Co-operatives were subject to the governance of its members – the farmers 
who sold produce to the co-operative. Senwes’ particular structure, common 
for the time, meant that farmer-members nominated and voted for 
representation on the Senwes governance board on a ward system. The 
representatives would then govern and report on activities, buying grain from 
its members and reselling it at the government mandated price. The aim of 
the co-operative was never to maximise profit. Instead, its primary function 
was to protect the collective operations and bargaining power of the farmers. 
                                                     
9
 This section is heavily based on an interview and subsequent interactions with senior 
executives at Senwes, as well as Senwes annual reports. (Anon 2016a) 
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It also helped to ensure mandated prices were enforced and to distribute the 
agricultural benefits from government. As such, its structure was from 
inception carefully designed to create and preserve a very specific agrarian 
elite. 
 
4.2 Transformation after Apartheid 
With the abandonment of agricultural protection under the new South African 
regime, Senwes, like many other co-operatives, converted its operating 
structure by issuing public shares to its members in accordance with their 
contribution to the co-operative, and become a public (although unlisted) 
company in April 1997. This represented an enforced migration from an 
organisation with a very social structure of voting and representation enjoying 
political support, to a financialised structure based on equity and capital, 
essentially seeming to substitute political support for financial industry 
support. Not only did support migrate, but so too did the axis of power in the 
co-operative world, shifting from the government to the holders of capital: the 
financial sector. 
 
During the transformation to a public corporation, there was therefore a 
marked shift towards maximising profit and value for its farmers-cum-
shareholders. Despite unofficially keeping the ward system as a way to elect 
board members, the shift in Senwes towards a corporatised firm seeking profit 
maximisation at all costs was swift and dramatic, driven by the immediate 
need to capitalise the newly formed public entity via equity participation.  The 
company abruptly moved away from its core activities in storage and 
intermediation as a source of growth. Instead funds were channelled towards 
unrelated investments in, among others, retail vehicle franchises, luxury car-
seat manufacturing and frozen vegetables. Much investment was also 
channelled towards speculative buying and reselling of minor equity stakes in 
a vast array of listed companies. 
 
The advent of the Safex played a significant role in Senwes’ transformation. 
With the formation of this market mechanism in 1995, it was suddenly 
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necessary for Senwes to employ traders and market analysts to inform grain 
storage policy when previously that was the domain of managers and 
scientists. This rapidly introduced the notion of securitisation and 
financialisation to its very core – transforming its traditional raison-d’être into a 
function of financial market speculation and not a function of its suppliers’ 
wellbeing. Indeed, because its suppliers were also transported into the 
financial market through share ownership, their wellbeing was thought to be 
expressed in an increasing share price. Because of such a fundamental 
challenge to its business model it was easy to justify and deepen financial 
market integration as a strategy for growth. Indeed, such rhetoric typified the 
management in the 1997-2000 period (Senwes 1997; Senwes 1998; Senwes 
1999).10 
 
Apart from speculation, Senwes has also formed a much closer relationship 
with financial institutions; its historic limitations to make investments and loans 
as it saw fit caused the relationship with commercial banks to be similarly 
limited. Under the newfound freedom, banks were increasingly used to 
provide leverage finance to fund the additional investments, but also to 
partner in other investments. In particular, the relationship Senwes had with 
Absa bank (formerly Volkskas11) before 1996 evolved considerably. Originally 
this relationship was a ‘client-corporate’ relationship – where the client 
(Senwes) initiates interactions with the bank and is dictated certain fixed rates 
and banking products. This evolved into a ‘corporate-corporate’ relationship 
where the bank would also approach Senwes to offer bespoke products and 
                                                     
10
 The annual reports immediately after market-orientated restructuring all sound exceedingly 
optimistic about the new trading mechanisms. As an example, the chairman wrote in 1997 
that “…the opportunities brought about by favourable grain crops were exploited effectively 
by … the Trade Department.” and “Due to certain proactive actions, the Grain Marketing 
Department capitalized on the opportunities resulting from exposure to natural market 
forces and made a significant contribution to the company’s financial results.” (Senwes 
1997). 
11
 Once again, the cultural implication of Senwes partnering with Volkskas Bank is interesting. 
Volkskas (translated roughly as “Fund of the Nation”) was formed to provide finance 
primarily to the Afrikaner population, being the only non-English bank in the country at 
inception. Being one of the six ‘axes of power’ that controlled the JSE, as outlined by Fine 
and Rustomjee (1996), the amalgamation of Volkskas into an international banking house 
seemed to have brought along its cultural partners into a financialised structure of capital 
accumulation. 
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preferential rates,12 giving birth to the advisory relationship where both Absa 
and Senwes often invested together (often the former doing so at the advice 
of the latter). This is evidence of the increasing sophistication and 
‘entanglement’ of the financial services industry in non-financial industries that 
is central to the financialisation literature (Ghosh 2005). As we later see in the 
Senwes debt crisis of 2000, the relationship evidently evolved into what can 
be described as mutually induced crisis, reminiscent of Palma’s (2000) 
analysis of induced macroeconomic crises. 
 
Apart from banking involvement, the Senwes share price rose with short-term 
market speculation, and because many farmers retained their shares simply 
out of a psychological value of the share, the supply was artificially 
depressed, causing bubble-like conditions. The management, who were, by 
virtue of the election process, more politician than businessman, impressed 
investors and other stakeholders enough to acquire more funding and spur 
further share price increase. These efforts mirror what was previously 
discussed under the short-term aspirations of maximising shareholder value 
through focusing on key accounting formulas (see Lazonick & O’Sullivan 
2000). 
 
4.3 The Senwes debt crisis of 2000 
 
When, in the wake of the East Asian debt crisis, the most severe economic 
shock yet of the newly liberalised South African democracy hit in 1998, many 
farmers sold both shares and farms in a large market consolidation (OECD 
2010). In order to combat an exchange-rate crisis at the time, the South 
African Reserve Bank increased the repo rate to exceptionally high rates in 
1998 (Carmody 2002). This in turn caused Senwes, who was by then heavily 
indebted, to struggle to make its repayments. At the same time, the economic 
down-cycle also caused one of Senwes’ biggest investments – in the retail car 
                                                     
12
 This view and wording of segmenting customers is common in the banking industry and 
speaks of a complex price discrimination mechanism to offer only high value services to 
high value clients. For more on price discrimination, see Meyer (1967). 
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sales market – to come to a grinding halt because of its dependence on 
available credit facilities. 
 
Then, in 1999, a drought occurred, which meant that several of the less 
efficient farmers (who had up until this point not experienced a severe drought 
without government subsidies) defaulted on finance and production 
obligations to Senwes, producing a much smaller than would be expected 
income from its traditional market. Many of these farmers also sold their land 
and shares in Senwes, creating a sudden supply shock in the share price 
which caused additional investor alarm. As a final coup de grâce, a recent and 
substantial investment by Senwes into car seat manufacturing turned sour 
when it emerged after the purchase that the company, Kolosus, had a 
pending intellectual property lawsuit worth millions of US dollars. 
 
This all raised serious concerns about the capabilities of the executive 
management. Being completely illiquid, very close to bankruptcy and on the 
verge of collapse, Senwes shareholders dismissed the old board and 
appointed new members, abandoning the old ward system. The new board in 
turn removed all but one of the old senior management, and agreed to be 
controlled by a consortium of banks to whom Senwes owed money, in 
exchange for better repayment terms. 
 
The above highlights how external developments (such as liberalisation, 
deregulation, the advent of agricultural derivative markets etc., themselves 
associated with financialisation) led to a financialisation in the operations of 
Senwes and increased its entanglement with the financial industry. This laid 
the basis for its subsequent crisis that then brought about even greater 
financial industry involvement. 
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Figure 2 – Composition of Senwes Management 
 
Note:  
“Science” includes degrees like BSc, BIng and similar  
“Finance” includes financial qualifications like Chartered Accountants, Professional Accountants and similar 
“Business” includes MBA, BCom degrees and includes accounting degrees below Honours level 
“Agri” includes specialised agricultural diplomas only 
 
Source: Senwes Annual Reports, own calculations 
The new board and senior management appointed after this intervention 
seems to have transformed as well. As Figure 2 shows, there was a marked 
migration of senior management and directors from scientific and agricultural 
backgrounds towards including more people with financial and business 
education backgrounds. The composition of farmers to non-farmers remained 
the same, however. The meritocratic standards used to appoint them also 
represented a change in the shareholders’ values from traditionalist trust in 
the elected representatives, to a market-orientated expectation to prove 
performance. The cultural change in Senwes was also dramatic. For the first 
time, Senwes felt not only the power, but the burden of accountability from its 
shareholders, and the change in culture suddenly shifted towards a more 
conservative approach to business (Senwes 2000; Senwes 2001; Senwes 
2002). 
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The new management was also subject to the bank consortium, who had to 
approve all important appointments and large transactions. They also 
implemented a strict standard of so-called ‘banking caveats’ to which Senwes 
had to comply. Most of these caveats represent what is generally understood 
to be ‘Good Corporate Governance’ and other features that constitute efforts 
to maintain ‘Shareholder Value’ and financial industry indices of sound 
investment such as sound Cost-to-Income ratio’s and multiple levels of 
mandated approval for transactions, as well as a much more powerful risk 
management function. These would instil in Senwes a strong sense of being 
part of a financialised economy, embedding its principles into the very culture 
of the organisation. 
 
4.4 Senwes under the banking reform 
One of the first actions under the new administration was a vast unbundling of 
Senwes’ investments to make bank repayments. Senwes sold more than 20 
majority stakes, almost all at a loss, to cover banking debts. Because of the 
sales, it reported considerable losses.13 Many of the investments sold, such 
as Country Bird, McCain Frozen Foods, Pioneer and Proffert, were then, and 
still are today, very profitable businesses, while others, like their vehicle 
retailers and Kolosus, were simply experiencing a temporary downturn. This is 
an interesting example of the ‘unbundling of value’ found in the literature 
(Newman 2014; Stockhammer 2008) – though here it is not so much a part of 
a planned corporate strategy, but rather imposed as a requirement for 
survival. Interestingly, most of the companies whose shares Senwes were told 
to sell by the banking consortium also had considerable shareholding or 
exposure from those very same banks.14 
 
                                                     
13
 Senwes reported a loss of R115mil in March 2000, while the consortium and new board 
were formed later in 2000. In March 2001, it reported a loss of R468mil, mostly because of 
the sale of its equity assets. In the same year however, it repaid R199mil of its banking 
debt. 
14
 In the most striking example, Absa Bank Ltd. had a 28% share in the car seat manufacturer, 
Kolosus, whose pending lawsuit caused considerable reputational damage to the Senwes 
management. Senwes’ 63% share in the company was sold for R1 to Claas Daun, who 
subsequently managed to settle the litigations through negotiations with the claimants.  
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Having settled most of the debts held by the banking consortium, the 
consortium was eventually dissolved in 2002. As a legacy, the banking 
compliance years left a dramatic cultural change in Senwes, which was now 
fully incorporated into a financialised agricultural industry. Senwes also 
maintained the meritocratic way of appointing board members and, more 
importantly, senior management – both now valuing financial prowess above 
technical knowledge (Senwes 2006; Senwes 2003). Senwes still appoints ex-
banking executives and financial professionals on its board in the form of non-
executive independent board members, and still complies to banking caveats, 
even though they are no longer binding. 
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4.5 A reformed Senwes 
After the bank consortium period, Senwes emerged with a renewed focus on 
creating value for its shareholders, but concluded that preserving and 
protecting its farmers is critical in doing so. The banking period’s divestiture 
meant that Senwes no longer had investments unrelated to the industry it was 
operating in, but also meant that it had sold valuable investments in 
businesses that were operating in its industry, such as the very successful 
seed developer company Pioneer. As a result, Senwes’ investment behaviour 
changed from an M&A strategy to greenfield investments, often through joint 
ventures capitalised by another partner. As an example, Senwes embarked 
on a 50-50 joint venture with Imperial Logistics Ltd. to facilitate its silo grain 
contract delivery offering, instead of simply buying shares in Imperial Logistics 
Ltd.  It also dramatically reduced the practice of hedging risk  through owning 
a large and diverse equity portfolio, something associated with a financialised 
concept of risk (Borio 2011). Instead, risk management became a function of 
corporate governance and diversification of product offerings through the 
above-mentioned joint ventures. 
 
The new dispensation therefore saw great importance in creating value for its 
shareholders and in building an attractive, stable share, though returned to a 
strong focus on maximising profit for its farmer suppliers, not only itself.  This 
prioritisation of shareholder value maximisation is witnessed by much higher 
dividend pay-outs as is seen in Figure 3 above. These increased from under 
10 cents per share before 2004 to the norm being above 40 cents with a spike 
in 2010 to a pay-out of 140  
cents because of the excess cash profits induced by high grain storage 
capacity (Senwes 2010). To be sure, Senwes was more profitable during the 
period of higher dividend yields, though this shows evidence of the unlocking 
of shareholder value that does not seem to support a retain-and-invest 
strategy. However, there is also little evidence of a downsize-and-distribute 
strategy, since the same time-period had few substantial divestments – again 
indicating the variegated experience of financialisation within Senwes. 
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At the same time considerable investment was made in Research and 
Development (not usually associated with financialisation) aimed at making 
South African farmers more competitive globally, as well as offering world-
class mechanisation technology and complimentary agricultural services. The 
alignment seemed to move from a situation where Senwes’ success meant 
the success of the farmers, to an understanding that the farmers’ success 
meant the success of Senwes.  
 
The relationships with banks also changed. Senwes seems to have wrested 
back much of the control the banks had over them, especially after 2005, 
primarily for three important reasons. Firstly, because of the sound and 
conservative corporate policy and culture, the Senwes risk appetite was 
considerably reduced, and there existed a much smaller need for banking 
institution products like debt and investment instruments. Secondly, there also 
emerged a general misalignment between the very cyclical nature of farming 
and the constant and rigid banking expectations. Because of Senwes’ 
proximity to its farmers, it was relatively easy for Senwes to expand its credit 
facilities to farmers and further disintermediate commercial banks. This may 
have contributed to a subtle power shift between Senwes and the banks.  
Finally, Senwes also played the major banks off against each other, 
embarking on a joint venture with Wesbank, while its traditional transactional 
banking partner was Absa bank. It also moved and threatened to move its 
substantial liquidity capital and transactional relationship. As a result of these 
factors, Senwes seems to have developed a relationship where their strategy 
informs banking behaviour, though the bank and ex-banking executives 
remain a powerful voice in the Senwes body. 
 
It is also in this period that Senwes embarked upon a BEE partnership, 
though this does not seem to have significantly altered its culture, operations 
or primacy of their farmer suppliers in the business model (this is discussed 
further below). What is clear from this period, however, is the variegated 
experience of Senwes during financialisation. It seems to have adopted a less 
close relationship with commercial banks than before and invested heavily in 
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R&D yet also made considerable dividend payments in pursuit of shareholder 
value maximisation associated with financialisation. The seemingly 
contradictory developments suggest a varied nature of agricultural 
financialisation in South Africa. 
 
4.6 Changes in operations and services 
During the Apartheid era, Senwes was primarily concerned with the storage 
and collective resale of grain and oilseeds. At 4.6 million tonnes total capacity, 
Senwes contributes close to a third of South African grain and oilseed storage 
capacity, and most of these silos have imperfect natural regional monopolies. 
Since the storage facilities are the only viable way to ensure commodity 
quality standards, all farmers are obligated to sell their produce to a silo 
before being able to sell it on Safex. The location and efficiency of the silo is 
also a critical factor in the profitability of any farm. As such, Senwes has 
established itself as a market leader in silo storage – it is not only the quickest 
off-loader of grain produce from a farmer’s truck, but it can also accept wet 
grains, which means farmers are able to harvest a few months earlier each 
season, affording valuable preparation time for the next season’s planting.  
Most of these innovations only emerged in the post-2005 period with Senwes’ 
refocus on farmers and core market efficiency. Yet despite its edge, Senwes 
is still capped by its silo footprint nationally, putting the proposed merger with 
NWK (see below) into better perspective. 
 
Because of its dominance in the storage market, Senwes has been found 
guilty of anti-competitive behaviour in the agricultural commodity market 
(Manoim et al. 2007). At the time of the finding, it contributed 16% of white 
maize trading, 9% of yellow maize, 24% of sunflower and 13% of wheat 
trading – thus being the largest single trader in all but the yellow maize market 
on the Safex bourse.15 The finding from the investigation confirmed the 
fundamental change in Senwes’ operational behaviour where, in the words of 
                                                     
15
 The Competition Commission found that, because in order to trade commodities, a farmer 
had to take their produce to storage, and because Senwes had a natural monopoly in 
storage in its areas, it was possible for Senwes to act uncompetitive in the downstream 
trading market. For more on the so-called ‘margin squeeze’ abuse of dominance finding, 
see Manoim et al. (2007). 
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the Competition Commission Tribunal “trading has become such an important 
component of its business that its trading strategy has informed its storage 
policy, with the trading tail wagging the storage dog” (Manoim et al. 2007:5). 
This once again shows the extent to which Senwes changed from a simple 
grain storer to a dynamic trader skirting the laws of competition policy. 
 
Apart from storage and selling of commodities – its traditional market – 
Senwes has also after 1996 developed and improved on a vast array of 
complementary services. From selling mostly wholesale agricultural inputs, 
Senwes has expanded a very large retail footprint and have secured the right 
to be the sole distributer of John Deere agricultural mechanisation equipment 
in South Africa, selling this mostly on instalment credit or on specialised 
harvest indentured financing plans. It has also filled the void left by the 
marginalisation of the Land Bank by expanding its financial services to offer a 
large bouquet of other financial services such as insurance and investment 
advisory services – pointing towards strong elements of financialisation. 
 
4.7 Transformation of ownership structure 
The Senwes ownership structure has changed and adapted somewhat to the 
changing circumstances. As mentioned, in 1996, 100% of the shareholders 
were farmer producers. At the outset a group of these farmers pooled 
together their shareholding to form Senwesbel Ltd., who has remained the 
single largest and controlling investor in Senwes, holding considerable sway 
of the company.16 
 
Senwesbel was created with the sole purpose of investing in Senwes Ltd. and 
is mandated under its Memorandum of Incorporation to require special 
shareholder permission to reduce its shareholding in Senwes below 35% of 
voting rights. It is also mandated to provide board nominations and 
appointments to Senwes (Senwesbel 1996). Senwesbel is in turn owned by a 
                                                     
16
 Of the 13 board members on Senwes’ board in 2015, 6 of them are appointed by 
Senwesbel, 1 by Grindrod, 3 were independent non-executive members and 3 were 
executive members with shareholding in Senwesbel. In other years, many of those 
members not directly appointed by Senwesbel, were also involved in Senwesbel. 
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collection of almost exclusively farmers, 10 of whom control close to 50% of 
the shares, while the other 50% is well distributed between smaller farmers. 
The composition and ownership of Senwesbel has seen no significant 
changes since its creation in 1996, and it has always remained the real seat 
of power behind Senwes. It’s dividend pay-out also mirrors that of Senwes 
closely. 
 
The composition of farmer shareholding in Senwes (either through Senwesbel 
or direct shareholding in Senwes) has significantly eroded since its inception, 
as visible in Figure 4. There are various causes of this reduction in ownership, 
but one of the most pervasive reasons may have been the increasing 
concentration of farmers within the agricultural industry – particularly in the 
Senwes area of operations. Thus, as farmers sold their farms and equipment 
to larger commercial farmers, they also sold their shares in Senwes – these 
largely being perceived psychologically as part and parcel of producing 
primary agriculture in the Senwes area. Some of these shares, like the farms, 
were seemingly taken over by other larger farmer producers, though many of 
the shares eventually found their way into investor hands and became traded 
on the open market. To guard against large amounts of speculative Senwes 
shares on the open market, Senwesbel has offered beneficial buy-back 
schemes, most notably in 2004 and 2014, to consolidate its holdings and 
retain control over decision-making. 
 
Interestingly, in the periods when Senwes was most focused on maximising 
shareholder value and speculating via financial instruments, its shareholder 
composition was much the same as the years that it was a co-operative. It 
could thus be said that the drive to maximise value for shareholders was not 
just a function of the demand from shareholders, but rather an internal 
response to the changing economic conditions as discussed above. Indeed, 
with shareholders consisting mainly of farmers, there was probably little stock 
placed on accounting indices and risk measurements. Here we can also see 
how the process of financialisation within the economy changed not only the 
operations of Senwes, but the psyche of shareholders, who after the debt 
crisis were suddenly much more sensitive to shareholder value maximisation 
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principles. To be sure, as Figure 3 illustrates, the post 2000 shareholder of 
Senwes certainly seemed to have also expected a much higher dividend pay-
out than before, further illustrating this changing psyche. 
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4.8 Senwes and Black Economic Empowerment Policy 
In early 2006, Senwesbel released a considerable portion of its equity in 
favour of a BEE partnership with the Royal Bafokeng Consortium (RBC).17  
The Consortium gained a 27% stake in Senwes, and appointed 2 board 
members, while Senwesbel agreed to reduce its shareholding in favour of the 
RBC to 35%. This relationship would become a source of great disagreement 
and disillusionment to both parties as the RBC aimed to wrest away greater 
power and influence from the entrenched Senwesbel group, both parties citing 
cultural differences as the source of disagreement. Whatever the nuances of 
the politically and socially volatile partnership, all parties agree that very little 
Black Economic Empowerment took place, with much resource wastage 
experienced.18 
 
From 2008, the RBC aggressively aimed to increase its shareholding primarily 
by buying from public investors. It did so also with the help of the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) and a black ex-Senwes board member. This 
led to similar share-buying by Senwesbel. In a hostile attempt to take control 
of Senwes, one of the members of the RBC, Treacle, attempted 
unsuccessfully to launch a lengthy court case against Senwesbel, claiming 
that the original share ownership Senwesbel had in Senwes was illegal. In 
2011 – disillusioned by its attempt to wrest control of Senwes, and unable to 
increase the RBC’s shareholding above 37% – the Royal Bafokeng Financial 
Investments Holding company, who constituted close to half of the RBC, 
decided to sell its shares.  After a first unsuccessful attempt to sell its shares 
to Treacle, it instead sold it back to Senwesbel.  Treacle in turn lodged a 
second unsuccessful case against Senwesbel, this time at the Competition 
Commission claiming the share-sale to be an uncompetitive merger. After 
                                                     
17
 The consortium consisted of the Royal Bafokeng Nation and the Treacle Nominees Holding 
Company – both BEE firms that were already fully capitalised and thus no need for a 
share funding scheme was necessary. The consortium later also included the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC), as well as shares held by a former Senwes executive, 
Oupa Magashula. The ownership contribution to the RBC changed over time, though the 
Royal Bafokeng Nation remained the largest, though less aggressive, of the partners. The 
preferential shares ceded to the RBC included a repurchase option that Senwesbel could 
exercise after a set period or if the RBC wished to initiate the return. 
18
 For a more complete discussion on the dynamics and failures of Black Economic 
Empowerment Policy in a financialised South Africa, see Marais (2011).  
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another 2 years of turbulent relations with Treacle, all the BEE partners 
eventually sold their shares, and a new strategic partner was identified in 
Grindrod Ltd., who then bought 20% of Senwes shares in the end of 2013. 
 
The failed attempt at redistributing capital in the agricultural industry seems to 
support Newman’s (2014) finding that financialisation is often tailored into a 
vehicle in which existing inequalities are aggravated or, at the least, 
maintained. The artificial fluctuations in the Senwes share price induced by 
the power struggle also support the notion of the detachment of underlying 
value, where the share price at the time grossly overinflated the underlying 
value of Senwes and causing a herd-mentality of investment. 
 
Here therefore, we see that financialisation favoured incumbents in two 
particular ways. Firstly, because ownership was now transferred to a 
supposedly ‘free’ system of share trading, it was assumed that ceding share 
ownership would translate into a cessation of control. Put differently, it was 
assumed that changes in ownership would mean changes in operations. 
Ironically, the pressure to create value for shareholders (be they black or 
white) seemed to override the pressure to transform business practices, 
probably because the former was supported by most shareholders, while the 
latter only by the BEE consortium (and then also with little clarity on what is 
meant with ‘transformation’). Thus, decisions on management positions and 
operating procedures were judged firstly on their merit to create value for 
shareholders, then clients, then employees and finally to transform in line with 
BEE legislation (Senwes 2007). Logically, shareholder value maximisation 
principles do not easily cater for fundamental restructuring and replacement of 
experienced executives, as BEE regulation suggests, and we thus see how 
financialisation contributed to BEE legislation playing second fiddle to 
shareholders. 
 
Secondly, under the equity participation scheme used in Senwes, the process 
was from the outset on the incumbent’s terms, with power greatly biased 
against the black entrants. Additionally, Senwes was coerced by legislation 
into adopting such a scheme, causing additional enmity before the process 
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even started. Not only were the existing shareholders therefore biased against 
the BEE Consortium, but internal management and employees, as well as 
clients, had a dislike of the new entrants. The financialised way in which 
transforming ownership and power within the economy (BEE) was 
approached, in this instance gave the impression to stakeholders that the 
Consortium was being unfairly given something that they did not merit – 
despite having bought the shares with their own capital.  
 
A final interesting observation is the way in which the share scheme created a 
black rentier class instead of a black industrial class, as the legislation 
intended (Chabane et al. 2006). Through share ownership – even a very large 
non-controlling portion – there was not a great opportunity for black 
participation other than being appointed directors or working as lower-level 
labourers. The middle and top level management remained closed to black 
professionals. Black owners or employees were not given a mandate or 
opportunity to build new ventures or capitalised new industries. Instead, they 
were expected to remain sanguine beneficiaries of Senwes’ rents. The 
moment they strove for more, they were met with hard resistance. 
 
4.9 International partnership 
Senwes’ subsequent partnership with Grindrod, an international logistics 
company, is seen as a way to grow a critical arm of Senwes’ business model, 
while Grindrod views the investment as a way to hedge and expand its agri-
processing business. The two companies seem to share a similar vision and 
have complementary corporate cultures; Grindrod still has a close to 90% 
South African shareholding despite its global footprint. Grindrod shows 
considerable evidence of being governed by shareholder value principles, as 
one would expect, since 37% of its shares are controlled by Financial Service 
Corporations. Its largest investor, Remgro Ltd. – the investment holding 
company founded by Anton Rupert – controls 23% of the company and 
seems to wield considerable sway over its governance, while its second 
largest investor, the Grindrod Family Investment Holding Company, controls 
only 10%. Thus more than 60% of Grindrod’s shares are held by Remgro and 
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the financial service industry collectively – creating a strong voice for 
shareholder value maximisation and financialised corporate governance. 
 
With the inflow of capital and a positive corporate atmosphere because of 
Grindrod’s partnership, the board at Senwesbel concluded successful 
negotiations with the board of NWK Holdings Ltd. to propose a merger.  NWK 
(formerly Noord-Wes Kooperasie, or ‘North-West Cooperative’ in English) is 
the third largest ex-cooperative in the grain and oilseed industry, and one of 
the closest geographic competitors to Senwes. Despite being competitors, the 
two companies already successfully merged their insurance and lime 
businesses and share a similar corporate culture and modus operandi. As 
such, they seem to be partners more than competitors, especially since the 
natural monopolistic nature of their immovable core businesses (grain 
storage) makes competition less relevant. 
 
Despite these evident synergies, however, the NWK board, who needed a 
67% approval from shareholders on the merger, received only 60% approval, 
and so the merger did not take place. 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
To capture the evolution of Senwes, we see how Senwes went from merely 
storing and selling grain, to an influential agricultural and quasi-financial 
intermediary that now sold seeds, equipment, insurance, bridging finance, 
derivative trading facilities, logistics and a vast array of retail service offerings. 
Its core business evolved from a function of science and management to a 
function of speculative trading and investment on Safex. The transformation in 
its shareholding was less pronounced, though the behaviour of the 
shareholders (though still farmer-producers) has brought about considerable 
managerial changes. Let us then examine the particular forces that 
empowered these transformations. 
 
Firstly, the influence of liberalisation and adoption of free-market 
macroeconomic policy is clearly seen. Its effects are seen most pronounced in 
 36 
the increased market concentration and the pressure of external competition 
which, in Senwes’ case, introduced the need to vigorously innovate and seek 
alternative income sources from its traditional operations. The latter would be 
the driving force behind the investment frenzy of 1996-2000. 
 
Secondly, the regulatory changes in the form of Safex allowed speculative 
activity to become a central part of the business model. This transformation 
may have had a disproportional effect on the modus operandi of the firm, 
spreading the adoption of a speculative culture throughout the rest of the 
business quite rapidly. Other studies on firms similarly affected by Safex’s 
introduction could offer further understanding of the scope of this 
transformation. 
 
Thirdly, the transformation of ownership structures also meant that ownership 
evolved from a quasi-political institution to a corporate financial structure. The 
effects this had on the psyche of the shareholders is seen in the way they 
suddenly expected unlocking of shareholder value and supported the 
movement to a more financialsed board and management. We therefore see 
that although the make-up of shareholders did not change much, the 
changing structure created a strong force by which financialisation was 
introduced and sustained in Senwes. 
 
Additionally, the changing role of banks in relation to Senwes – particularly the 
relationship with Absa – would be another major force facilitating 
financialisation. It does not seem as if the bank played a significant role in 
driving financialisation, though it certainly enabled an environment of rampant 
debt accumulation and financial market speculation. Indeed, one sees how 
the banks enabled both the growth of Senwes while sowing the seeds of its 
crisis as well, which in this case caused even more financialisation of the 
company. The way in which the banks enforced divestiture and appointment 
of senior officials with a financial background is evidence of this. 
 
Finally, the idiosyncratic features of Senwes, being an expression of Afrikaner 
agrarian capital, also caused additional impetus towards financialisation. From 
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a political economy perspective, when support from the Afrikaner government 
evaporated in 1994, the only alternative under the new regime was to 
embrace a free-market reliance on the finance sector. Indeed, its early 
survival and capitalisation was utterly dependent upon close relationships with 
financial actors, be they banks, public shareholders or financial analysts. As 
mentioned earlier, the pervasive survivalist tone19 employed by Senwes 
executives at the time support the notion that the transformation was also a 
function of the perceived lack of an alternative strategy. This also explains the 
overall stickiness of Senwes share ownership and opposition against BEE 
policy as shareholders saw themselves as part of this group ‘struggling for 
survival’, as it were. Indeed, the Senwesbel shares seem to trade more like a 
private company; shares did not often circulate into non-farmer hands. In the 
‘margin squeeze’ case at the Competition Commission, it was also clear that 
Senwes was quite willing to offer very favourable storage terms to farmers at 
the expense of non-farming traders – again pointing towards a polarised 
perception of survival. 
 
I would therefore conclude that, although Senwes showed considerable signs 
of financialisation by diverting funds from productive enterprise to financial 
speculation and experienced a mutually induced financial crisis that caused 
considerable entanglement with the financial services industry, it seemed to 
have moved past the most destructive forms of financialisation. In essence, 
the financialisation process has been variegated. The accumulation of capital 
has remained primarily through financial channels, as Bonizzi (2013) 
supposed, though the agrarian elite seems to have effectively safeguarded 
this accumulation to mostly remain in the hands of Afrikaner agrarian capital.  
The shareholder make-up of Senwesbel and Senwes also challenge the 
emergence of a rentier class, as described by Demir (2007), in this section of 
agriculture.  Both Senwes and in turn Senwesbel are still strongly owned by 
                                                     
19
 Evidence of this survivalist tone can be found in many Senwes or Senwesbel annual 
reports.  Some excerpts: “If we want to survive, the interest of every farmer must be 
pooled…with the interest of the co-operative” – (Sentraalwes 1990); “[We] are fighting for 
survival (Sentraalwes 1992);  “Many [farmers’] operations are directly dependent upon the 
survival of Senwes” (Senwes 2000). 
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farmer producers, supporting Lapavitsas’ (2010) view of the false dichotomy 
between a rentier and productive class. 
 
Let us then next examine the ZZ2 case, since the financialisation experience 
of ZZ2 differs markedly from that of Senwes, offering an alternative 
perspective on South African agriculture. 
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5 Case study – ZZ2 Group20 
5.1 Introduction 
The ZZ2 Group is a large family-owned primary-agriculture producer in the 
horticulture21 sub-sector. It is the largest producer of tomatoes in the southern 
hemisphere, contributing more than 40% of total tomato production in South 
Africa (Mandizvidza 2013). It also has substantial investment in mangoes, 
avocados, other tropical and sub-tropical stone fruits, apples, vegetables as 
well as some livestock. It is the largest agricultural producer in Limpopo 
province and makes a considerable contribution22 to the Johannesburg Fresh 
Produce Market, which is the largest fresh produce market in the world (Anon 
2016c). It has captured considerable market share for most of the products it 
produces, especially tomatoes, avocados and onions. It is also one of South 
Africa’s largest non-grain exporting operations. 
 
5.2 Formation and Growth 
The founding father of ZZ2 is Bertie van Zyl, who in 1948 leased a piece of 
land in the Mooketsi area of Limpopo with the aim of producing potatoes. Van 
Zyl, who had very progressive social views for his time, farmed produce that 
were not being regulated or supported by the National Party government’s 
agricultural protectionism and marketing boards. As such, he also struggled to 
obtain capital through the Landbank.23 After leasing the farm for 12 years, Van 
Zyl eventually obtained a mortgage loan with what was then known as 
Barclays Bank (later First National Bank Ltd.). 
 
                                                     
20
 This section is primarily based on a personal interview held with a senior ZZ2 executive 
(Anon 2016b). 
21
 In general, the term ‘horticulture’ includes the cultivation of vineyards, citrus and apple 
orchards, as well as soft fruits like bananas – all belonging to some agricultural board 
under Apartheid. In this study, horticulture is used to refer to agricultural activities that were 
excluded from agricultural boards primarily because of the relatively small size of the 
market that they represented. As such, it generally includes all vegetables. 
22
 Daily and seasonal fluctuations, as well as difficulties in measurements, make ZZ2’s 
contribution hard to pin point but it ranges between 3% and 7% of total products on the 
market, impressive considering that more than 5000 farmers deliver to the market daily. 
23
 According to local farmers, funding from the Landbank during the early and middle years of 
Apartheid was very much linked to political and religious affiliations. As a progressive 
person who did not belong to one of the larger church affiliates, van Zyl was likely 
marginalised. 
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Being an efficient producer and having a sustainable way of maintaining 
labour relations, van Zyl managed to develop one of the most efficient farming 
operations in the region, slowly growing his operations through the acquisition 
of additional land. When in the 1980s his children also joined the company, 
they brought considerable expertise and corporatized structures of doing 
business. It was during this time that the ZZ2 Group developed the complex 
ownership structure that it is still governed by today (see below). 
 
Having expanded its operations from potatoes into tomatoes and other 
vegetables, ZZ2 emerged as a very profitable enterprise that managed to 
deliver high production volumes per hectare and benefitted from economies of 
scale. It developed a strongly benevolent patriarchal business ethos, where 
workers received free housing, electricity, food, education and healthcare, as 
well as a fair salary for the time. The labour productivity result of such a 
retention strategy is evident in their higher-than-normal yields, and relatively 
peaceful labour relations. 
 
Since the family subscribed to a much more progressive ideology than what 
was the norm in farming communities, it viewed the regime change in 1994 
with much more positive anticipation than most. It also felt no real change to 
its operations with the abolition of agricultural protectionism, since it had 
enjoyed almost none of the benefits of such protection. The changing 
agricultural sphere, and the general sense of negativity, partly due to the 
threat of land reform, allowed ZZ2 – an already efficient producer – to acquire 
additional land at prices that may have been substantially reduced. 
 
The changes, however, were not without incident. In 2002, a claim for land 
restitution was instated on ZZ2 property, the applicant claiming to have 
historically been moved of the land due to race-based legislation. After a court 
found no evidence of such history, it was dismissed, though not without some 
negative publicity. Similarly, some labour unrest in 2003 when broader 
national labour policies were implemented also found negative publicity, 
though with no legal basis. Considering these events, ZZ2 passed surprisingly 
unscathed through a very turbulent time for the rest of the industry and has 
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consistently grown both its operations and its market share. After trade 
liberalisation, it has managed to carve out considerable export markets, 
particularly in the European avocado market, and have strong export 
connections with the United States, Spain and Israel.  It also developed one of 
the largest horticulture research facilities in the country, spending large 
amounts on research and development annually. Because of these 
technological and efficiency benefits, it consistently delivers much higher than 
average yields, successfully competing globally in several of its products. 
 
5.3 Ownership Structure 
The ZZ2 Group consists of several family trusts that own shares in several 
private companies, whose shares are not openly traded. Although ZZ2 has 
some central functions like accounting and logistics that all the companies 
share, each operation essentially functions as a separate private company.  
The companies are not all wholly owned by the Van Zyl family, an example 
being the Namibian palm date operations being partially owned by the Van Zyl 
family trust and an Israeli consortium that they approached to partner with, yet 
it trades under the ZZ2 brand. As such, the shareholding power is fairly 
diluted and complex in most of these companies.   
 
This structure also does not lend itself to a financialised concept of 
shareholder value principals. The lack of tradability of shares also mean that 
operations are not concerned with creating a good-looking share value, but 
rather to give the existing shareholders confidence that the resources are 
managed well. Here, this does not mean a good ROI or favourable Cost to 
Income ratios; instead the measure of success for a business is based on its 
agricultural production per square metre (benchmarking this to global 
standards). Thus, success is not a function of financial prowess, but rather 
managerial and scientific excellence. Finally, dividends are also not regular, 
although not uncommon, and may vary between the different companies 
under the ZZ2 Group. Companies with non-family shareholders generally pay 
dividends more frequently than family-owned companies, where wealth is 
spread more through employment and asset acquisition. A common way to 
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capitalise new ventures, for example, is to issue dividends that automatically 
convert into private shareholding of the new venture. 
 
This structure has de facto remained fairly unchanged – apart from additional 
investing partners in new ventures.  Partners are also meticulously chosen for 
similar business ideology that stresses production efficiency above 
shareholder value maximisation and over-exploitation of resources. The 
structure also effectively allows for the ring-fencing of new ventures in order to 
limit the influence of new partners in the rest of the Group. 
 
5.4 ZZ2 and the Financial Industry 
Although the ZZ2 Group has considerable leverage finance and transactional 
products with commercial banks, its borrowing practices have always been 
prudent and debt-averse. It also very rarely holds financial investments, 
instead diverting excess capital to new ventures, technology or fixed property. 
ZZ2 engages in the practice of multi-banking, which means that banks are 
often played off against one-another, and do not serve a prominent advisory 
role in the Group. Instead, ZZ2 relies on other international consultants and its 
sizeable contingent of graduate professionals for advisory services. 
 
As a Group, it has taken a strategic decision to not hedge with financial 
instruments or engage in speculative equity trading, nor has it ever seen this 
as a potential field of expansion (Anon 2016b). Since none of its products are 
traded or remotely related to those traded on the Safex bourse, ZZ2 also does 
not house or plan to house any trading division or activities. Its main method 
of engaging with risk is in hedging through diversified primary horticulture 
operations; it plants across various climatic regions and plants various 
different products to allow consistent supply throughout the year. It does not 
see a need to hedge from South African market risk and, as such, only has 
one non-South African farming operation.24 
 
                                                     
24
 The palm-date operation was done in Namibia simply because no suitable climate was 
identified in South Africa, and the palm date was identified as a strategic expansionary 
venture. It is thus not embarked upon as an action of risk mitigation. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
The study on ZZ2 thus found almost no signs of financialisation, despite 
evidence pointing towards some form of corporatisation. The way ZZ2 has 
engaged in and expanded through the policies of trade liberalisation in the 
South African economy also show clear signs of being fully integrated into a 
globalised economy, though they managed to be integrated into the global 
financialised economy on very different terms than what is usually understood 
under financialisation. Let us further expound upon the dynamics of the 
various forces in play. 
 
Firstly, we see how the internationalisation of South African agriculture 
presented great exporting growth opportunities to ZZ2, while the liberalisation 
of agriculture had little effect on the unregulated horticulture sector. Because 
of the low debt levels at ZZ2 (a product of its traditional exclusion from 
mainstream agriculture and its financing infrastructure) it was relatively 
unaffected by the spill-overs from the East Asian debt crisis, unlike Senwes. 
 
Secondly, the opening up of the Safex and the JSE certainly offered 
opportunities for ZZ2 to expand into speculative financial activities to hedge 
risk and increase revenue, though ZZ2 did not use any of these structures. 
This may be because, unlike Senwes, the opportunity to speculate was not 
inculcated into the core business of ZZ2, largely due to the nature of its 
produce (tomatoes and avocadoes cannot be stored and then sold only when 
the market price is right, nor can they easily be grouped into commodity 
buckets as is possible with grains). This fact explains why speculative trading 
was never embraced or made part of the ZZ2 operations. 
 
Thirdly, the ZZ2 ownership structure never allowed broad permeation of the 
shareholder value principles because its shares were never traded openly. Its 
marginalisation under Apartheid meant that it was historically forced to 
capitalise itself, and thus it had no need to find new capital sources when the 
regime changed. This meant that it did not have to transform ownership 
structures. It therefore managed to keep to a ‘retain and invest’ policy instead 
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of a ‘downsize and distribute’ model, making the need to find capital later on 
in its lifecycle less likely. 
 
For the same reason, there was also not a great need to develop a deep 
relationship with banking institutions. The nature of its operations also differ 
from mainstream agriculture in two important ways. Firstly, the horticulture 
industry has much smaller firm sizes with much less mechanisation. It 
therefore has a much smaller need for equipment finance or financing of large 
public facilities like storage or processing. Secondly, because of the very long 
and stable planting operations in the grain industry, bridging finance, 
insurance and security against crops is a viable financial product. The same 
cannot be said for a field of tomatoes that fruit in a fraction of the time and its 
value and quality being grossly indeterminable. These reasons help us 
understand why the relationship with the financial industry has remained 
something separate and uninvolved to the business operations of ZZ2. 
 
Finally, from a political economy perspective, the fact that ZZ2 was excluded 
from mainstream Afrikaner capital under Apartheid probably laid the 
foundation for its independent success under the new regime. When other 
farmers failed without protection and succumbed to land claims, the ZZ2 
Group bought more land at reduced prices. When mainstream farmers 
lamented the changing South African economic and political climate, ZZ2 
expanded its South African operations. It also does not seem to subscribe to 
the survivalist tone common to traditional farming operations. It would 
therefore seem that, because of its exclusion from mainstream Afrikaner 
capital, it had a markedly different experience of the transformation, and 
managed to avoid being adversely affected by financialisation. 
 
Interestingly, the ZZ2 organisational culture seems to have been shaped by 
these forces that shielded it from being financialised itself. This organisational 
culture can most easily be expressed in understanding its farming 
methodology. As a contrast to the heavy use of pesticides and ecologically 
destructive mechanisation typified as ‘precision farming’, ZZ2 applies what 
they call ‘Naturefarming’. This practice is similar to organic techniques, though 
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still employs pesticides and fertilisers as a last resort (Goldblatt 2011). In the 
same way, ZZ2 seem to use financial institutions only as a last resort; instead 
opting for a sustainable and longer-term growth trajectory where others seek 
profit through high intensity techniques. 
 
In conclusion, the ZZ2 case study thus highlights the varied experiences 
within agriculture, and the complexity of post-Apartheid South African 
agriculture. It also points towards the existence of a corporatized and fully 
international company without evidence of financialisation. Similar firm-level 
case studies in the horticulture industry would allow us to understand if the 
lack of financialisation can be attributed more to the industry or idiosyncratic 
features of the ZZ2 case. Perhaps it is also a convergence of both. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The study has shown the variegated nature of financialisation within South 
African agriculture. We see strong signs of a swift and extensive 
financialisation experience in Senwes, while not seeing signs that the process 
created a new and separate financial/rentier class (with the possible exception 
of the black rentier class created through BEE legislation). We also see the 
South African agrarian capital transformation in that its mode of accumulation 
seems to have migrated to financial channels and motives, though the 
composition of this class has remained fairly unchanged, albeit much more 
concentrated. We see how financial institutions play a facilitative role that both 
empowers the new method of accumulation, and creates the conditions for its 
downfall. 
 
On the other hand, the ZZ2 case shows that the transformation was not 
homogenous in agriculture. Some forces, like liberalisation, were instrumental 
in creating the conditions under which Senwes financialised, though these 
same forces created the conditions under which ZZ2 could expand its 
operations and capital accumulation. At the same time, both its operations 
and accumulation remained very much outside of the financial sphere. Most of 
the transformations affecting South African agriculture were felt in both 
Senwes and ZZ2, though the latter was fully corporatized and included in a 
global market, without seemingly being radically altered by the financialised 
economy. 
 
An important difference between ZZ2 and Senwes is therefore the terms in 
which the link to the larger agricultural industry and its elites. While ZZ2 
remained very much marginalised, Senwes was central to the agricultural 
production chain. As such, broad sweeping forces in agriculture like land 
reform and protectionism essentially had no effect on ZZ2 while Senwes 
experienced these as a threat to its very existence. This explains why ZZ2 
had greater agility to react to these forces, incorporating their effects more on 
their own terms. 
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Another key theme of the study is the changing behaviour and role of banks 
within a financialised South African economy, particularly evident in the 
Senwes case study. Not only did commercial banks suddenly expand their 
range of services and bespoke financial products specifically to agricultural 
firms, but they also become much more involved in non-financial industries, 
sometimes through direct control and governance. Their continued equity 
involvement in agricultural services (now in the form of joint ventures) shows 
the pervasive nature of financial industry entanglement. The case study also 
shows the dynamics by which financial asset bubbles create firm-level debt 
crises. 
 
From a Marxian perspective, this study also offers insights into the 
transformation of capital accumulation. The Senwes case showed how the 
migration from productive income as a source of profit, to financial income as 
source of profit has happened. Evidence of a speculative sector supplanting 
the real/productive sector of capital is lacking, however. Most capital 
investment and commodity speculation by Senwes pertained to real 
production and underlying assets; there is very little evidence that Senwes 
traded and retraded commodities. The notion of integration of real 
accumulation into financial channels is heavily supported by the Senwes case 
study, where Senwes’ mode of agricultural accumulation was successfully 
converted into a complex financialised shareholding structure. Once again, 
the ZZ2 case study shows the varied evidence of this conversion into financial 
channels, where their ownership migration to privately held shares has a 
much less financialised characteristic and structure.  
 
We can thus conclude that in South African agriculture, the forces of 
liberalisation, internationalisation and financialisation has indeed transformed 
much of the industry, though the transformation and its extent remains 
variegated. Different sub-sectors and idiosyncratic features within the firms 
meant that the experience of South African agrarian capital is far from 
homogenous. Comparative firm-level studies on firms within the primary 
agricultural sector both in grains and horticulture will allow us to better 
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understand if this paper’s findings are pervasive within the industry. Studies 
on primary grain producers in the Senwes area will shed some valuable light 
to determine how primary producers were affected through Senwes’ 
financialisation, while studies on horticulture firms will allow us to understand 
how idiosyncratic the changes in ZZ2 really are compared to the rest of the 
economy. 
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